MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge.
Plaintiff, Mario Diaz, appeals the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Mr. Diaz was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Eudolio Lopez when that vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Darrell Butler. Mr. Diaz filed a petition for damages for alleged injuries sustained in the accident against Mr. Lopez and his insurer, Assurance American Insurance Company, and Mr. Butler and his insurer, Allstate.
Allstate filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that Mr. Butler was not covered under an Allstate policy at the time of the accident. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Allstate submitted the cancellation notice mailed to Mr. Butler, a "Record of Mailing," and the affidavit of Kathy Collard, an employee at Allstate's Customer Enterprise Service Center.
Mr. Diaz contends that the trial court erred in granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment because (1) Allstate failed to meet its burden for summary judgment; (2) Allstate failed to satisfy the requirements for proper cancellation of an automobile policy for non-payment of premium; (3) Allstate's cancellation notice was inadequate under Louisiana law; (4) Allstate failed to satisfy the proof of notice requirement; and (5) the trial court erred in considering the affidavit of Kathy Collard, an Allstate employee.
We review the trial court's granting of a motion of summary judgment de novo using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Fleming v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 99-1996, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/12/00), 774 So.2d 174, 176.
At the time of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966 provided that summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission, together with the affidavits, if any, admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment,
La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). "Evidence cited in and attached to the motion for summary judgment or memorandum filed by an adverse party is deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment unless excluded in response to an objection made." La. C.C.P. art. 966(F)(2). In determining whether an issue is "genuine," courts cannot consider the merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony or weigh evidence. Mitchell v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 01-0596, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So.2d 517, 519 (citations omitted).
Mr. Diaz contends that summary judgment was not appropriate because Allstate's cancellation notice and procedure were not valid under the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1266. The statute provides, in pertinent part,
Under the provisions of this statute, an insurance company may cancel a policy for nonpayment of premiums ten days after mailing a cancellation notice to the insured with reason for cancellation. Here, Allstate submitted the "auto policy cancellation notice for nonpayment of premium" sent to Mr. Butler. The cancellation notice contained "information as of January 14, 2011." The notice stated
Ms. Collard stated in her affidavit that the policy records of all persons insured by Allstate who reside in Louisiana were in her care, custody, and control. She stated that after searching the records of Mr. Butler's policy, she found that this policy was not in effect on the date of the accident — May 19, 2011. Further, she stated:
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Diaz argued, without submitting any evidence, that Allstate failed to meet its burden because the cancellation notice was inadequate and Ms. Collard's affidavit was improper because it was not based on her personal knowledge.
We find that Allstate met its burden of proving that there are no genuine issues of material fact, specifically that Mr. Butler was not covered under an Allstate policy on the date of the accident. The evidence submitted on the motion showed that Allstate properly cancelled the policy by mailing a notice of cancellation to Mr. Butler's address at least ten days prior to cancelling the policy. Following receipt of the cancellation notice, Mr. Butler did not submit a payment, and, thus, Allstate cancelled the policy.
Mr. Diaz's assignment of error that Ms. Collard's affidavit was not based on her personal knowledge has no merit. Ms. Collard stated in her affidavit that the records of all policies in Louisiana were under her care, custody, and control. Ms. Collard stated in her affidavit that she "diligently reviewed" Mr. Butler's policy records and found that a cancellation notice was sent to Mr. Butler informing him that if he did not pay the $779.80 that he owed, his policy would be cancelled. Further, she stated that Mr. Butler did not make a payment prior to the date contained in the cancellation notice. We find that Ms. Collard's statements were based on her personal knowledge as she was the custodian of Mr. Butler's policy records. See, Plummer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 98-1291 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/99), 738 So.2d 21.
For these reasons, the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of Allstate is affirmed.